The Hamas decision to seize control of Gaza was born out of the realisation that this was the only available way of gaining the recognition, or at least attention, of the international community. Since its election victory in January 2006, it had been cold shouldered. The west’s strategy did not change even after Hamas joined a unity government with Fatah three months ago.
Just as Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was recognised only by Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, the Talibanisation of Gaza would leave it a pariah state with only Iran and Syria for friends. The consequences for Gaza’s one million starving Palestinian population are alarming. At the moment nobody knows who will pay the salaries of more than 120,000 public-sector employees. Will Israel allow food and aid to get across checkpoints? What will happen to Palestinians crossing the border from Gaza to Egypt?
While Hamas’s leaders do not appear to have answers to any of the questions, it seems that some of them, at least, are aware of the responsibilities they face. Al-Zahhar sent a message to the Israelis that said: “Hamas will not attack Israel before Israel attacks us.” This raises another question: What will be Hamas’s attitude towards other Palestinian factions such as Islamic Jihad or even Fatah’s military wing, known as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, should they continue launching rocket attacks against neighbouring Israeli settlements? The only certainty would be the strength of Israel’s response.
The timing of Hamas’s military victory over Fatah suggests it must have co-ordinated with, or consulted, Tehran and Damascus. It is now clear that the sophistication of Hamas’s arsenal easily dwarfed Fatah’s resistance. However, that weaponry will count for little, surrounded as Gaza is by a hostile world.