Since the US invasion in 2001, Afghanistan has seen multiple private armies take control of the country’s security sector.

The private security compound was on the outskirts of Kabul. Situated along the road to Jalalabad on a notorious strip of highway, the landscape was industrial with sun-drenched low mountains on the horizon, shipping containers, dust swirling in the air, and mud across the ground.

Countless logistics companies are housed behind high concrete walls here. This industry has enjoyed a massive growth spurt since the US-led 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, despite the Hamid Karzai government reportedly taming it this year.

Al-Akhbar met the Western head of one of the country’s leading private security firms. While Indian Gurkhas trained outside, hoping to join the company’s ranks, the former British soldier explained that “we don’t call ourselves mercenaries” but are rather a reliable corporation that provides “static” security for foreign embassies, journalists, aid companies, hotels, and other key assets. The company opened in Afghanistan soon after the US invaded, and according to its head, it “survives off chaos.”

“From 2002 onward,” he said, “we worked with the Afghan government because the Ministry of Interior could not offer security to businesses or people and Western insurance companies insisted on the use of private military companies [PMCs]. Internationals felt they could not trust the Ministry of Interior when moving from province to province.”

Such logic is how the industry self-perpetuates even though Karzai has demanded for years that these companies be replaced with the Ministry of Interior’s Afghan Private Protection Force (APPF) through Presidential Decree 62.

According the head of the company, APPF implementation in 2012 has been “chaotic.” During our interview, he received a call from an American client who didn’t understand Karzai’s new PMC rules. “One Afghan is supposed to be in every PMC in the country, but this has never happened,” he said.

The stated rationale for the massive growth in this industry globally, especially in war zones since September 11, has been the complicated nature of modern conflict. The company head offers a simpler explanation. “The Americans, British, and foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are not big enough to re-build nations, so PMCs are needed to fill the void. We protect contractors building prisons and schools. If the US had used more troops, we would not be necessary.”

The multiple justifications for the 2001 invasion today ring hollow as women’s rights and development in rural villagers are lacking. America has spent tens of billions of aid money in the country and yet working services are minimal.

There is little evidence of lasting infrastructure built by the West, except for a handful of newly built roads and buildings in central Kabul. The outskirts of the capital remain poor and under-developed and districts further away have largely missed investment, except for some power lines and smooth asphalt near Surobi town.

Apart from the escalating rate of civilian deaths, at the hands of both Taliban and Western forces, the rise of private security armies has defined the war. This reality has resulted in recurring contractor crimesagainst Afghan civilians where no one was held accountable. The record of Western security firms post 9/11 is filled with a troubling lack of justice for victims.

Al-Akhbar spoke to two Afghan men in a restaurant near the center of Kabul. Both had families who’d suffered privatized violence first hand. Tariq-U-Rahman and Fahim, both from Wardak Province, explained that they faced threats before being forced to move to Kabul by three elements: the Taliban, US forces, and private security companies.

Afghan firms have been hired and empowered by the US military to transport their gear across the country. The job is to guard the convoys but they regularly establish so-called “security perimeters” and in the process exchange fire with the Taliban, wantonly harming civilians. One of the worst offenders is Watan Risk Management, a leading company with close times to the Karzai family that pays off the Taliban not to attack US convoys.

Fahim said his cousin, a shopkeeper, was shot dead by a Watan private security guard one year ago for no other reason than being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Watan admitted fault, he said, and offered US$20,000 compensation but the family was still waiting for the money. The wife and children were now struggling despite the family financially assisting them.

Fahim, an unemployed engineer, said he wasn’t overly concerned about the proposed 2014 departure of Western forces because the Taliban, who he expects to take over, would “hopefully” at least bring some stability and peace to the country, as had happened before the 2001 invasion. He also hoped that private security companies, whose individuals never face justice for killing and maiming civilians, would become unnecessary because there would no longer be any US convoys to protect.

Fahim said that private security companies could be necessary in other countries with more stability but in Afghanistan they had only brought “misery and violence.” Neither believed the Karzai pledge to completely disband the firms because they are controlled by the “powerful” close to government. “They have too much to lose if the companies shut down,” Fahim said.

The current situation in Afghanistan confirms his scepticism. M.Ashraf Haidari, an American-educated senior Afghan official who is the Deputy Assistant National Security Adviser and Senior Policy and Oversight Adviser to Karzai, said that Afghan authorities were closing the “illegal and un-licenced” firms and said that “the new rules attempt to regulate the system.”

International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] spokesman Jimmie E. Cummings Jr. said the same thing, detailing the Karzai government’s Presidential Decree 62 that “mandated the dissolution of private security companies by the end of November 2010.”

In many cases this has happened. But a number of Western and local security corporations confirmed they are still operating and imagine doing so for years to come, finding ways around the new rules. “Many embassies, for example, simply won’t trust the Afghan Private Protection Force and will continue to rely on foreign security companies,” one said.

The supposed purpose of the industry is to undertake tasks the state’s military can’t or won’t do. But in a poor nation such as Afghanistan, resentment built quickly when it was discovered that the Afghan army was getting paid much less than the private militias.

Outsourcing security isn’t the only privatized resource in the country. Intelligence is increasingly collected by private companies and given to American, Australian, and British forces. This information often forms the basis of the notorious, American-led night-raids across the nation that have caused the death of countless civilians and bred deep anger toward the West.

An Afghan translator who had recently worked with the US on night-raids in Kandahar said that the vast majority of home invasions targeted the wrong people, inflaming anti-Western hatred. He was targeted himself by the Taliban in Kabul.

It was only years after the 2001 invasion, according to a leading Western analyst in Kabul, that the West understood that their policies, alongside a corrupt Afghan government, “were fuelling the insurgency.” This realization convinced the Western military establishment to hire private intelligence firms in order to better understand the people they were fighting. There was the “clean slate idea,” the analyst said. “Namely that you get rid of the Taliban and install new leaders. But they actually empowered old figures with bad records.”

The Western-head of a private information gathering organization said that his company’s work was increasingly common because “today’s wars aren’t between two equal sides.” He used Afghans across the country to prepare briefs about the latest political and security situations for Western embassies but he claimed this information “never serves military purposes.”

The darkest side of privatized intelligence is corporations gathering information about Afghans for use in Western counter-insurgency operations. Jeremy Kelly in the London Times published extracts in March of documents by US-based “consultancy company” AECOM. They had been hired by NATO to spy on mosques, universities, and the general community throughout the country. The work started just over one year ago.

There are files detailing conversations from March 2012. People complain about the Karzai government’s corruption and inefficiency, clerics in mosques demand Western forces leave immediately, personal matters are discussed including vocalized support for the insurgency, proposed marriages between the Taliban and local girls, and complaints about troubles when working in Iran.

The research comes from a range of districts and is separated between “supportive” and “non-supportive” individuals of the NATO mission.

One man in Jowzjān province said: “About 30 percent of our people believe that they should pick up weapons and start a jihad against ISAF soldiers. Another 70 percent believes that the financial situation is too weak and they do not have the ability to organize a fight against ISAF soldiers. Our country has been at war for the past three decades, and we are tired of war. We just want to live in peace.”

Another entry, from 14 March in the Shibirghan District, details an “overheard conversation between two Uzbek males between the ages of 40-45 at market.”

In the report one man said, “The other day I was riding on a bus when it became very windy. It seemed as if it was raining dust. People were saying that this could be a sign God’s wrath. This is happening to us because the Americans have burned the Quran, but we are calmly sitting idle. We should be rising up against the Americans for what they have done. We are being punished for doing nothing.” [A different] resident stated, “I do not know, but it might be possible.”

Such details appear mundane, but this is exactly the point. It is such seemingly insignificant comments that form the basis of Western “intelligence” against an enemy that continues to elude the most powerful military in the world.

These normal and daily conversations of local villagers form the “intelligence” behind US-led night-raids. Mistakes are routinely made. Innocent men are kidnapped. Many are killed. It is a failed counter-terrorism policy that is fuelling the insurgency.

People in Afghanistan believe the recent announcement that Afghan forces would now take the lead in night-raids was spin to show the Karzai government has sovereignty in its own country.

More disturbingly, the US military and its allies have no idea of the agendas of the Afghans giving them intelligence. Respected organizations such as The Afghanistan Analysts Network refuse to undertake commissioned work for clients, because they are worried their research may be co-opted for military means. As soon as the Taliban was toppled in 2001, Northern Alliance forces and their allies routinely sought payback from enemies, real and imagined. A reporter from the Chicago Tribune witnessed this trend as far back as November 2001.

That was then. Today, the US government realizes it will have to negotiate with the Taliban but is hiring private firms to better understand who should be targeted first. Being Taliban or related to Taliban members does not necessarily mean an individual is against the country’s positive future but the US too often sees all Taliban members or affiliates as the enemy.

Wikileaks has revealed countless names of innocent Afghans swept up in the invasion chaos. Their indefinite detention and torture at the hands of Afghan forces – the US still passes captured Afghan prisoners to Afghan-run jails with notorious records of abuse – led some of them to join the insurgency.

Most of the Western media coverage of Afghanistan remains focused on high-profile events such as the recent attack in the center of Kabul. While it is undoubtedly important in the context of Afghan security forces’ ability to assume full control by 2014, it only tells a small part of the picture.

Privatized security and intelligence is now a natural part of Western war making. America simply cannot and will not launch missions without the backing of often unaccountable companies that compliment its defense industry.

Since the departure of US troops from Iraq, thousands of foreign contractors still populate the country. Afghanistan will likely be no different after 2014. The lack of Congressional oversight or judicial review is deeply concerning and reflects an attitude of contempt toward the local laws of the occupied nation.

During Al-Akhbar’s visit to Afghanistan, in Kabul and surrounding districts the main message received was distrust of foreign forces, both fear and admiration of the Taliban, and loathing of Western and local private militias. The key lesson in Afghanistan is that invading, bombing, and empowering local warlords won’t bring either security for locals or safety for the West.

Antony Loewenstein is an independent journalist and author who is currently working on a book and documentary about disaster capitalism.

The Pentagon’s prosecutors formally charged Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four other men last week with war crimes for planning and carrying out the murder of 2,976 people on Sept. 11, 2001, and referred their case to a constitutionally flawed military tribunal that will be convened at the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, a global symbol of human rights abuses.

The conspirators have been held for more than nine years. As Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, the chief military prosecutor, said in a speech at Harvard on Tuesday, the use of military commissions “has become a matter of the rule of law and of recognizing that at some point justice delayed really is justice denied.” But it is worth remembering how we got to this system and this place — the worst way to administer justice to the 9/11 terrorists.

Let’s start with the delay. All of the men could have been brought to trial years ago, but President Bush decided he could ignore the Constitution. He ordered them to be held in secret C.I.A. prisons and subjected to brutal and illegal interrogations. Mr. Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times in one month alone. That torture produced no useful intelligence, according to virtually all accounts, except those offered by people like former Vice President Dick Cheney, who was the key architect of the Bush administration’s lawless detention and interrogation policies.

When Mr. Mohammed was moved to Guantánamo Bay, finally, with the four others, there were immediate questions about whether they could ever be tried legitimately, given how tainted the evidence was. Mr. Bush did nothing, content with arguing that Congress’s decision to declare a perpetual state of war with Al Qaeda gave him the right to hold prisoners indefinitely without any trial.

President Obama came into office pledging to close Guantánamo Bay and restore the rule of law to the treatment of terrorism suspects. He has largely failed.

Following America’s lead in Gitmo for media? What cretins. And what role, if any, has British multinational Serco played in these restrictions?

The Immigration Department developed its new, highly restrictive policy on media visits to detention centres with reference to US military arrangements governing media access to the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detention centre.

Documents released under freedom of information show the ”deed of agreement” that Immigration insists journalists and media organisations visiting detention centres must sign was ”informed by … the current US Department of Defence media access policy for its detention facility at Guantanamo Bay”.

The department also justified extremely tight media control and censorship to the Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, as ”the right balance” in circumstances that included ”the current climate associated with media ethics, media ‘phone hacking’ [in Britain]”.

In an email to a reporter who was consulted on the policy, Immigration’s national communications manager, Sandi Logan, said, ”I reckon while the phone hacking scandal is all the rage, what else would the media expect of us? Trust you say? Gimme a break, sorry!”

The Greens’ immigration spokeswoman, Sarah Hanson-Young, said yesterday ”the idea that [media access] guidelines have, even in part, been inspired by Guantanamo Bay is absolutely appalling – it really shows the attitude of Immigration and [the] government – they have forgotten that they are dealing with asylum seekers, not criminals or terrorists.”

The policy requires that journalists visiting detention centres must be escorted at all times by Immigration officers. There is a bar on any ”substantive communication” with detainees, a right for officials to censor recordings, and the right for Immigration to immediately end any visit.

The chief executives of the largest media organisations, including Fairfax Media’s Greg Hywood, News Ltd’s Kim Williams and the heads of all TV broadcast networks last month condemned the agreement as ”unacceptable censorship”.

Documents released to the Herald under FOI show the agreement was drafted with reference to past departmental policy and present practice at NSW, Victorian and Queensland prisons.

 …

In his submission, Mr Logan justified tight restrictions on media access to safeguard the privacy of detainees, prevent publicity that could affect refugee claims and to manage ”risks that during any media visits detainee clients would use the media’s presence as an opportunity to protest their continuing detention”.

…

Mr Logan privately consulted 12 journalists. More responses were negative than positive, with the proposed arrangements being described as ”incredibly restrictive”, ”draconian and heavy-handed”, ”a shocker” and ”a lawyer’s picnic.” However Immigration made no further submission to Mr Bowen who endorsed new arrangements without amendment on October 6.

Since October, the ABC, SBS, Channels Seven, Nine and Ten, The Australian and The Daily Telegraph have signed the deed of agreement for visits variously to detention facilities at Villawood, Maribyrnong, Inverbrackie and Wickham Point.

In their letter to Mr Bowen last month, media CEOs argued the fact media organisations have signed the deed ”should not be taken as agreement to its terms”.

Last month philosopher Patrick Lin delivered this briefing about the ethics of drones at an event hosted by In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture-capital arm (via the Atlantic):

Let’s look at some current and future scenarios. These go beyond obvious intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), strike, and sentry applications, as most robots are being used for today. I’ll limit these scenarios to a time horizon of about 10-15 years from now.

Military surveillance applications are well known, but there are also important civilian applications, such as robots that patrol playgrounds for pedophiles (for instance, in South Korea) and major sporting events for suspicious activity (such as the 2006 World Cup in Seoul and 2008 Beijing Olympics). Current and future biometric capabilities may enable robots to detect faces, drugs, and weapons at a distance and underneath clothing. In the future, robot swarms and “smart dust” (sometimes called nanosensors) may be used in this role.

Robots can be used for alerting purposes, such as a humanoid police robot in China that gives out information, and a Russian police robot that recites laws and issues warnings. So there’s potential for educational or communication roles and on-the-spot community reporting, as related to intelligence gathering.

In delivery applications, SWAT police teams already use robots to interact with hostage-takers and in other dangerous situations. So robots could be used to deliver other items or plant surveillance devices in inaccessible places. Likewise, they can be used for extractions too. As mentioned earlier, the BEAR robot can retrieve wounded soldiers from the battlefield, as well as handle hazardous or heavy materials. In the future, an autonomous car or helicopter might be deployed to extract or transport suspects and assets, to limit US personnel inside hostile or foreign borders.

In detention applications, robots could also be used to not just guard buildings but also people. Some advantages here would be the elimination of prison abuses like we saw at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. This speaks to the dispassionate way robots can operate. Relatedly–and I’m not advocating any of these scenarios, just speculating on possible uses–robots can solve the dilemma of using physicians in interrogations and torture. These activities conflict with their duty to care and the Hippocratic oath to do no harm. Robots can monitor vital signs of interrogated suspects, as well as a human doctor can. They could also administer injections and even inflict pain in a more controlled way, free from malice and prejudices that might take things too far (or much further than already).

It is the other Guantánamo, an archipelago of federal prisons that stretches across the country, hidden away on back roads. Today, it houses far more men convicted in terrorism cases than the shrunken population of the prison in Cuba that has generated so much debate.

An aggressive prosecution strategy, aimed at prevention as much as punishment, has sent away scores of people. They serve long sentences, often in restrictive, Muslim-majority units, under intensive monitoring by prison officers. Their world is spare.

Among them is Ismail Royer, serving 20 years for helping friends go to an extremist training camp in Pakistan. In a letter from the highest-security prison in the United States, Mr. Royer describes his remarkable neighbors at twice-a-week outdoor exercise sessions, each prisoner alone in his own wire cage under the Colorado sky. “That’s really the only interaction I have with other inmates,” he wrote from the federal Supermax, 100 miles south of Denver.

There is Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, Mr. Royer wrote. Terry Nichols, who conspired to blow up the Oklahoma City federal building. Ahmed Ressam, the would-be “millennium bomber,” who plotted to attack Los Angeles International Airport. And Eric Rudolph, who bombed abortion clinics and the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.

In recent weeks, Congress has reignited an old debate, with some arguing that only military justice is appropriate for terrorist suspects. But military tribunals have proved excruciatingly slow and imprisonment at Guantánamo hugely costly — $800,000 per inmate a year, compared with $25,000 in federal prison.

The criminal justice system, meanwhile, has absorbed the surge of terrorism cases since 2001 without calamity, and without the international criticism that Guantánamo has attracted for holding prisoners without trial. A decade after the Sept. 11 attacks, an examination of how the prisons have handled the challenge of extremist violence reveals some striking facts:

¶ Big numbers. Today, 171 prisoners remain at Guantánamo. As of Oct. 1, the federal Bureau of Prisons reported that it was holding 362 people convicted in terrorism-related cases, 269 with what the bureau calls a connection to international terrorism — up from just 50 in 2000. An additional 93 inmates have a connection to domestic terrorism.

¶ Lengthy sentences. Terrorists who plotted to massacre Americans are likely to die in prison. Faisal Shahzad, who tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square in 2010, is serving a sentence of life without parole at the Supermax, as are Zacarias Moussaoui, a Qaeda operative arrested in 2001, and Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, among others. But many inmates whose conduct fell far short of outright terrorism are serving sentences of a decade or more, the result of a calculated prevention strategy to sideline radicals well before they could initiate deadly plots.

¶ Special units. Since 2006, the Bureau of Prisons has moved many of those convicted in terrorism cases to two special units that severely restrict visits and phone calls. But in creating what are Muslim-dominated units, prison officials have inadvertently fostered a sense of solidarity and defiance, and set off a long-running legal dispute over limits on group prayer. Officials have warned in court filings about the danger of radicalization, but the Bureau of Prisons has nothing comparable to the deradicalization programs instituted in many countries.

¶ Quiet releases. More than 300 prisoners have completed their sentences and been freed since 2001. Their convictions involved not outright violence but “material support” for a terrorist group; financial or document fraud; weapons violations; and a range of other crimes. About half are foreign citizens and were deported; the Americans have blended into communities around the country, refusing news media interviews and avoiding attention.

¶ Rare recidivism. By contrast with the record at Guantánamo, where the Defense Department says that about 25 percent of those released are known or suspected of subsequently joining militant groups, it appears extraordinarily rare for the federal prison inmates with past terrorist ties to plot violence after their release. The government keeps a close eye on them: prison intelligence officers report regularly to the Justice Department on visitors, letters and phone calls of inmates linked to terrorism. Before the prisoners are freed, F.B.I. agents typically interview them, and probation officers track them for years.

Both the Obama administration and Republicans in Congress often cite the threat of homegrown terrorism. But the Bureau of Prisons has proven remarkably resistant to outside scrutiny of the inmates it houses, who might offer a unique window on the problem.

In northern Bucharest, in a busy residential neighborhood minutes from the heart of the capital city, is a secret the Romanian government has long tried to protect.

For years, the CIA used a government building — codenamed “Bright Light” — as a makeshift prison for its most valuable detainees. There it held al-Qaida operatives Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, and others in a basement prison before they were ultimately transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2006, according to former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the location and inner workings of the prison.

The existence of a CIA prison in Romania has been widely reported, but its location has never been made public. The Associated Press and German public television ARD located the former prison and learned details of the facility where harsh interrogation tactics were used. ARD’s program on the CIA prison is set to air Thursday.

The Romanian prison was part of a network of so-called black sites that the CIA operated and controlled overseas in Thailand, Lithuania and Poland. All the prisons were closed by May 2006, and the CIA’s detention and interrogation program ended in 2009.

Unlike the CIA’s facility in Lithuania’s countryside or the one hidden in a Polish military installation, the CIA’s prison in Romania was not in a remote location. It was hidden in plain sight, a couple blocks off a major boulevard on a street lined with trees and homes, along busy train tracks.

The building is used as the National Registry Office for Classified Information, which is also known as ORNISS. Classified information from NATO and the European Union is stored there. Former intelligence officials both described the location of the prison and identified pictures of the building.

In an interview at the building in November, senior ORNISS official Adrian Camarasan said the basement is one of the most secure rooms in all of Romania. But he said Americans never ran a prison there.

“No, no. Impossible, impossible,” he said in an ARD interview for its “Panorama” news broadcast, as a security official monitored the interview.

The CIA prison opened for business in the fall of 2003, after the CIA decided to empty the black site in Poland, according to former U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the detention program with reporters.

Shuttling detainees into the facility without being seen was relatively easy. After flying into Bucharest, the detainees were brought to the site in vans. CIA operatives then drove down a side road and entered the compound through a rear gate that led to the actual prison.

The detainees could then be unloaded and whisked into the ground floor of the prison and into the basement.

The basement consisted of six prefabricated cells, each with a clock and arrow pointing to Mecca, the officials said. The cells were on springs, keeping them slightly off balance and causing disorientation among some detainees.

The CIA declined to comment on the prison.

As a front-page article in Finland’s leading daily Helsingin Sanomat today explains, the Finnish government have reluctantly been compelled, in response to requests by Amnesty International, to release some data about suspicious planes passing through Finnish territory between 2001 and 2006. But does the government have the will to investigate the loose ends which this data has brought to light?

The mysterious flight of N733MA in March 2006 is a case in point. According to the data released by the Finnish foreign ministry, this plane flew from Porto in Portugal to Finland, arriving in Helsinki at 20:37 on the 25th of March. After that, it disappears from the record, with no onward route given – except that we know from other sources that two hours later it had mysteriously reappeared in Lithuania. According to the parliamentary inquiry on the establishment of CIA secret prisons in Lithuania, on its arrival there this plane was not greeted by the usual border checks, because the security services had written to the border guard the day before … asking them not to check the plane.

Guantanamo detainee Abu Zubaydah filed a case against the government of Lithuania in the European Court of Human Rights last Friday, concerning his secret detention in Lithuania in 2005-6, so the time is ripe for the Finnish government to look seriously at the implications of this, and other, new disclosures. On 23 September Reprieve and partners Access Info Europe filed a freedom of information request about more potential renditions planes passing through Finland. The response, from transport agency Trafi, is now well overdue. Will they, and the government, make the necessary effort to get to the bottom of this murky history? They are likely to be faced with increasingly difficult and embarrassing questions in the near future if not.

Good on Amnesty for running this campaign. And some people are upset?

During the 2008 election, Barack Obama emerged as the consummate anti-war candidate. He wanted to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center, funnel resources to the home front, and generally remedy the nation’s reputation as a global bully. Now, as the 2012 elections ramp up, he continues to carve a softer stance on foreign policy, telling voters that “the tides of war are receding.” But how much has actually changed? Neither disillusioned Democrats nor triumphant Republicans have had much data to go on. Until now.

In an exclusive analysis, Newsweek combed through a decade of military deployment history, and found only a faint line between the Bush and Obama presidencies. The number of American troops abroad has dropped less than 1 percent under President Obama, buoyed by what appears to be a sharp rise in the number of clandestine assignments, and curious growth in the number of personnel at Guantanamo Bay. None of the robust deployment trends begun under Bush have significantly abated. And since World War II, only President Bush has scattered a greater proportion of American might overseas: 39.5, 42.8, and 39.1 percent of American troops were abroad between 2006 and 2008, compared to Obama’s 39.3 percent in 2009 and 38.2 percent as of December 2010, the most recent date for which worldwide data is available.* Even with an aggressive—or, to some minds, reckless—drawdown in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, it would take nearly another 300,000 tickets home before the military was as united at home as they were on September 10, 2001.